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CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING IN THE 
BURGER YEARS 
Joel B. Grossman* 
THE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE SUPREME 
COURT, 1969-1986. Edited by Herman Schwartz. New York: Viking. 
1987. Pp. xxv, 293. $22.95. 
Dividing the Supreme Court into periods denominated by the 
name of the chief justice is a venerable and useful custom, but also a 
risky practice if it implies an exaggerated role for the chief justice or 
an analytically meaningful segmentation of the Court's work. We may 
thus refer to the years 1969-1986 as the "Burger Court" only so long 
as we do not forget that it was not, in any predominant way, "Warren 
Burger's Court." Likewise, as some (but not all) of the essays in this 
collection make clear, some of the conservatizing trends said to mark 
the Burger Court were, in fact, merely continuations of developments 
and ideas already apparent in the last years of the Warren Court. The 
title "The Burger Years" is thus at least an implicit recognition of the 
artificial and ephemeral boundaries imposed by the comings and go-
ings of chief justices. 
The Burger Years, which began as a series of commentaries in The 
Nation, offers a left/liberal perspective on the recent course of consti-
tutional law. It is firm, though not heavy handed, in its ideology; and 
light (with a few exceptions) in its analysis. The views of its authors, 
most of whom are law profe.ssors and/or liberal political activists, are 
predictable. Their common task is to assess (and lament) first, the 
degree to which the Supreme Court, after Warren Burger became its 
chief, departed from the benchmark decisions and trends of the War-
ren Court; and second, what these departures might imply for the fu-
ture of constitutional jurisprudence. The book predates the 
controversy over President Reagan's ill-fated nomination of Robert 
Bork, and the subsequent appointment of Judge Anthony Kennedy. 
But its not-so-hidden concern is clearly what will become of the Court 
- and the Constitution - under the stewardship of William Rehn-
quist. Things can only get worse, or so it would appear. 
I 
Herman Schwartz's introductory essay offers some analytical in-
• Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison. B.A. 1957, Queens Col-
lege; Ph.D. 1963, University of Iowa. - Ed. 
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sight to the mostly uncritical critical perspective of his coauthors. 
Echoing the theme of an earlier volume on the same subject, 1 
Schwartz suggests several reasons why the Burger Court fell into a 
slow but steady drift to the right, characteristically avoiding the cut-
ting edge of ideology rather than engaging in a more direct and ex-
plicit repudiation of doctrines which, it was assumed, no credentialed 
conservative (and particularly not one appointed by a Republican 
president) could permit to continue. 
We know that the institutional tradition of stare decisis (however 
attenuated at the Supreme Court level), and incremental decisionmak-
ing practices tend to undermine even the most devoted judicial efforts 
at radical change. Likewise, we recognize that the appointment pro-
cess does not always produce the "right Justice." Justices appointed 
because it is believed they hold certain views may not hold such views; 
or they may not hold them very strongly; or once on the Court, their 
views may change. Ideology is not a perfect predictor of subsequent 
judicial performance. The judicial role may also liberate ideas and val-
ues imprisoned by the dictates of a prior legal or political role, as the 
liberalism of Earl Warren, and the (still ongoing) metamorphosis of 
Harry Blackmun suggest. Who could have predicted, for example, 
that one of the most influential and liberal modern interpretations of 
the first amendment would be written by the second Justice John Mar-
shall Harlan?2 Or that William Rehnquist, in his first year as chief 
justice, would reject a tenth amendment challenge to taxing and spend-
ing clause regulations designed to establish a national drinking age of 
twenty-one (and be flanked on the right by Brennan and O'Connor)?3 
The view from the bench may, indeed, be very different from one's 
views before the bench! 
The unexpected moderation of the Burger Court also reflected a 
changing external environment. Judges cannot make the world stand 
still (and they are not too good at making it move, either!). Decisions 
which seem to some critics to be revolutionary and illegitimate (and 
crying out for repudiation) may seem much less (or more) so over 
time, after their impact has been assessed. Thus, Miranda v. Arizona, 4 
despite all the initial prophecies of doom aq.d gloom, has not fatally 
undermined the police interrogation process. To be sure, this is partly 
because the Supreme Court has narrowed the decision's scope and ap-
plication. But it is also true that the police have learned to live with 
the Miranda rules (and in some unexpected ways Miranda has helped 
them); and the Court now accepts that red flag of Warren Court liber-
1. THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (V. Blasi ed. 1983). 
2. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
3. See South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987). 
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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alism as "strik[ing] the proper balance."5 Mapp v. Ohio, 6 on the other 
hand, while much less controversial at its inception, has become a pri-
mary target (and likely victim) of judicial conservatives. This is partly 
because conservatives have accepted, or want to believe, distorted esti-
mates of its impact, 7 but also because a significant upgrading of the 
law of search and seizure since Mapp has substantially enhanced the 
stakes in the exclusionary rule debate. 8 
A changing external environment can also influence the Court's 
agenda, and thus the parameters within which it can effectively oper-
ate. Initial Supreme Court hostility to affirmative action, for example, 
has been replaced by a grudging, albeit limited, acceptance that equity 
and equality are not implacable opposites, and that moderate affirma-
tive action remedies are consistent with other constitutional values. 
Having rejected the Reagan administration position that affirmative 
action (including school desegregation) is proper only when it provides 
make-whole relief to individuals who have been personally injured,9 
the Supreme Court is hardly likely (or able) to reverse the tide of lim-
ited affirmative action efforts which are now so widespread in both the 
public and private sectors. Having initiated and fostered a legal 
revolution favoring gender equality, the Court, even if it were of a 
mind to do so, could hardly reverse itself amidst the strong social cur-
rents pressing to carry that revolution even further. Having recog-
nized that students, prisoners, and hospital residents have 
constitutional rights, the Court is unlikely to tum the clock back to 
the "hands off" doctrine of an earlier day, although the Burger Court 
did narrow the constitutional protections which members of those 
groups now routinely expect and seek to expand.10 Rights, once set 
loose, are very difficult to contain; rights consciousness - on and off 
the Court - is a powerful engine of legal mobilization and change. 
The recent debates over original intent and derivative constitu-
tional rights, which focused mainly on, but were not limited to, the 
right of privacy, did little to damage and much to strengthen the 
emerging regime of rights which confronted (and for the most part 
5. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1143 (1986). 
6. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
7. See Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of 
the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. BAR 
FOUND. RES. J. 611. 
8. See, e.g., Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (The Court tightened restrictions on 
searches pursuant to a lawful arrest.); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (The Court 
imposed new restrictions on electronic surveillance, and more generally, linked searches to ex· 
pectations of privacy.); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (The Court limited warrantless 
home arrests.). 
9. See Local No. 93, Intl. Assn. of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Local 28 of 
the Sheetmetal Workers Intl. Assn. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 21 (1986). 
10. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (Inmates have no fourth amendment protec-
tion against searches in their cells.). 
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resisted) the Burger Court. The juxtaposition of Judges Bork and 
Kennedy reveals little support for original intent as an exclusive the-
ory of constitutional interpretation, and very considerable public sup-
port for some constitutional right to privacy, whatever its origins. 
What those nomination debates revealed is that most people (and per-
haps many judges, too) care little for theoretical niceties and jurispru-
dential subtleties; what concerns them are specific applications of 
those rights which, for reasons of ideology or personal benefit, they 
may favor or oppose. Thus the constitutional right of privacy is not in · 
serious danger of repudiation. The Burger Court accepted this, and so 
too will its successor. 
To whom this right applies, and how it applies, however, remain 
controversial and dynamic issues still open to judicial revision. Just as 
the Court sometimes sets constitutional boundaries (and goals) for the 
society and the political system, so too its effective agenda must reflect 
the national agenda and the realities of political dynamics. The Bur-
ger Court did not repudiate the liberalism of the Warren Court in 
wholesale fashion because the Supreme Court is inescapably part of a 
political society which had absorbed and largely sustained the values 
to which the Warren Court had subscribed. What looked like judicial 
radicalism in the 1960s had become, except to a few die-hard conser-
vatives, mainstream jurisprudence and politics in the 1980s. 
One final perspective on the Burger Court's "conservative conser-
vatism" needs to be elaborated; regrettably, it is not addressed in this 
book. Not only was the Burger Court operating in a changed, and 
changing, policy arena, but it was itself an institution undergoing 
modest, but important, structural change that may well have contrib-
uted to its conservative "drift." The Supreme Court is, at best, neither 
well suited nor often disposed to making sharp doctrinal breaks with 
the past. Serial negative incrementalism 11 is usually its top speed. But 
the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a breakdown in institutional consensus 
marked by a sharp increase in closely divided decisions, a proliferation 
of opinions, substantial increases in the length of opinions, and exten-
sive footnotes. This was no doubt a response to increasingly complex 
and ideologically charged issues generated by the growth of the ad-
ministrative state and the proliferation of rights and rights conscious-
ness. It was also the practical consequence of a divided Court. But 
there has also been a gradual bureaucratization of the Court's internal 
procedures marked, most importantly, by an enlarged clerk pool and 
substantial enhancement, at least in most chambers, of the clerks' re-
sponsibilities. As I have pointed out elsewhere, this is more a 
bureaucratization of diffusion rather than of lockstep Weberian hier-
11. By which I mean the common practice of announcing a constitutional rule but deferring 
to subsequent cases to provide a precise operational definition of what that rule means or 
requires. 
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archy. 12 But it cannot be ignored in explaining the drift of the Burger 
Court. The Burger Court's lack of a clear ideological direction was 
thus rooted in changing institutional norms as well as in judicial tradi-
tions, a divided bench, and external political reality. 
II 
What were the main currents of doctrinal evolution and constitu-
tional thinking in the Burger years? Supreme Court policymaking 
rarely produces clear policy statements or guidelines for implementa-
tion of its decisions. Few decisions are as specific as Miranda in spell-
ing out just what has been decided, what must be done, and who is to 
do it. This encourages reliance on conventional doctrinal analysis, 
which conveniently focuses on what the justices have said in a few 
leading cases, with little regard for process or context. Unfortunately 
that is what most of these essays entail. 
Nevertheless, several cross-cutting themes emerge. One is the im-
portance of the Burger Court's effort to contain and modify efforts to 
relax the rules governing access to the federal courts. Another is its 
persistent effort, in a number of policy areas, to blunt the cutting edge 
of Warren Court liberalism by reducing the scope of federal judicial 
intervention to enforce constitutional rights. 
As to the first theme, Burt Neuborne and Herman Schwartz (pp. 3, 
177) both argue that there was a mixed record of decisions regarding 
access to the federal judiciary to claim or protect constitutional rights. 
Access rules, which are often expressed conceptually as matters of jur-
isdiction or justiciability, go to the very heart of the judicial function 
and our understanding of the Supreme Court's proper role. Is it the 
Court's job merely to decide disputes between adverse parties, or does 
it have a broader "public law" function of expounding (perhaps even 
creating) and protecting constitutional rights? Is its role to be justified 
and its legitimacy derived solely or primarily by fidelity to the tradi-
tional rules of bipolar constitutional adjudication, or is it to be evalu-
ated by some external measure of function or outcome?13 
It is possible to read the Burger Court's record in two ways. There 
can be little doubt of its predisposition to refashion traditional limits 
on the ability of taxpayers and citizens to employ the courts for a gen-
eral airing of political grievances, i.e., to "challenge the system." The 
Court not only limited the briefly emergent taxpayer standing doctrine 
12. See J. GROSSMAN, SOME THOUGHTS ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S 
ROLE AND STRUCTURE (1985). 
13. See Grossman, Judicial Legitimacy and the Role of the Courts, 1984 AM. BAR FOUND. 
RES. J. 214 (reviewing M. SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
(1981)) and sources cited therein, especially: Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litiga-
tion, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); and Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term - Foreword: 
Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982). 
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of Flast v. Cohen 14 but even tightened, at least rhetorically, traditional 
standing doctrine by adding to it "injury in fact" and "causation in 
fact" requirements. 15 The justiciability doctrine of political questions, 
which had been substantially narrowed by the Warren Court, seemed 
likely to take on new life (though never, I think, to return to its pre-
Baker incarnation).16 And the Burger Court erected a high barrier 
against federal habeas corpus review of constitutional issues in state 
criminal trials. 17 
Access is affected not only by doctrines of jurisdiction and jus-
ticiability, but also by certiorari practices, substantive rules and consti-
tutional interpretations, and remedial doctrines. Empirical studies 
have shown more than a tendency for Supreme Court justices to grant 
review primarily to reverse lower court decisions they believe to be 
erroneous.18 In the Burger Court, there was a clear pattern of grant-
ing review in criminal cases to prosecutors challenging the reversal of 
convictions by the lower courts (often their own state supreme courts), 
and, reversing the pattern of the Warren Court, few grants to defen-
dants seeking review of their convictions. 
Reversal of substantive doctrinal trends may also be a signal to 
potential litigants that certain cases and issues are likely (or very un-
likely) to be selected for review. The post-1930s consensus against 
economic substantive due process, for example, has been strictly en-
forced by refusing to take cases challenging state economic regula-
tions, a pattern continued by the Burger Court. Potential challenges 
to official authority have been limited by curtailment of the expansion 
of the state action doctrine, 19 by setting high barriers of immunity for 
some (though not all) political officials,20 by limiting the occasions for 
federal court intervention in state court proceedings,21 and by at-
tempts to revive the eleventh amendment to ward off constitutional 
challenges to state policies.22 
Likewise, the Burger Court's decisions on major criminal justice 
issues, including capital punishment and prisoners' rights, must cer-
tainly suggest to those target groups that relief from the current 
14. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
15. E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
16. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
17. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
18. D. PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME CoURT (1980); 
Provine, Deciding What to Decide: How the Supreme Court Sets Its Agenda, 64 JUDICATURE 320 
(1981). 
19. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). See also Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 
U.S. 149 (1978). 
20. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). 
21. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny. 
22. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halder-
man, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). 
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Supreme Court is unlikely (although they are peculiarly unlikely to be 
dissuaded from seeking review). While not repudiating the basic prin-
ciples of Brown v. Board of Education 23 and Baker v. Carr, 24 the Court 
has cut back on available remedies for, and judicial intervention to 
protect against, violations of those decisions.25 Overall, the Court 
made it clear that it would not be hospitable to certain kinds of consti-
tutional claims and thus to certain classes of claimants. 
The Burger Court did not uniformly close all courthouse doors to 
nontraditional litigants. It often permitted an expanded judicial re-
view of administrative agency decisions, which not only benefited envi-
ronmentalists and those challenging nuclear power, but also those 
challenging restrictions on private property. And, often over the op-
position of the Chief Justice, it did substantially enhance remedial op-
portunities for those seeking redress for violations of constitutional 
rights. 
Neubome (p. 3) argues that, on balance, the Burger Court favored 
the more traditional, and restrictive, rules of access, and the more lim-
ited judicial role which those rules serve. I think he is essentially cor-
rect. But if our baseline is the 1950s instead of the 1960s, then the net 
result of the Warren and Burger Court decisions has been substan-
tially to enlarge access to the federal courts. It seems highly unlikely 
that even the Rehnquist Court would return us all the way to the 
much narrower private law view of standing and of which issues are 
appropriate for Supreme Court consideration. 
Like Neubome, I prefer a more flexible, open-ended view of the 
Court's function, and an expanded conception of access which is sensi-
. tive to nontraditional litigants and causes. It is, in my judgment, the 
only tenable position for the Supreme Court of the 1980s (leaving 
aside questions of particular doctrines). Constitutional rights and val-
ues ought not to be merely instrumental means of resolving .disputes 
selected for decision by essentially technical criteria, but instead 
should be aspirations of a liberal polity to which the Supreme Court 
can make more than a modest contribution. On the other hand, in 
order for the Supreme Court to function effectively as a policymaker it 
must also be seen as a court. Its legitimacy can never rest entirely on 
the outcome of its decisions. I share Neubome's rejection of a rigid 
''Marbury" model of adjudication,26 but he does fail to address the 
23. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Board of Educ. 
(Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
24. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
25. Of course, this retrenchment has been countered by efforts to bypass the Supreme Court 
by reliance on state law and state constitutions, which state supreme courts can interpret more 
liberally than the federal constitution. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
26. Pp. 1-5. It is clear what Neubome means by a Marbury model of adjudication, but it is 
an apt metaphor only because it has come to be used that way. Technically speaking, Neuborne 
is correct; the decision turned on a hypertechnical reading of article III limitations on the 
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necessary question of limits. Is he urging adoption of the William 0. 
Douglas position that all citizens should be allowed, more or less with-
out restraint, to become private attomeys-general?27 Surely not; but 
then who should have standing to litigate in the federal courts? What 
kinds of cases should be allowed - encouraged? Is there room in our 
constitutional scheme for a constitutional "cop-·out" such as the polit-
ical questions doctrine? This is not the forum to answer those ques-
tions, but clearly they must be addressed in any complete assessment 
of the Burger Court. 
A second theme of these essays might be labeled "phased regres-
sion from the liberal norm of federal judicial intervention to protect 
constitutional rights." The strategy of the Burger Court (if strategy is 
the right word) was in many instances to accept the basic principles of 
major Warren Court decisions while at the same time altering their 
meaning and/or undermining their remedial force and applicability. 
Thus, while Brown has been deified, its engine has stalled; the Supreme 
Court has clearly orchestrated a policy of federal court disengagement 
from the desegregation arena. Justice Brennan's updating of Brown in 
Green v. County School Board, 28 which required evidence of achieve-
ment of a "unitary, nonracial school system" in de jure segregated 
systems, was subsequently diluted in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education to permit a significant number of one-race 
schools.29 Thus a school child does not have an enforceable constitu-
tional right to attend an integrated school (the word integration is, of 
course, never used), but only the right to attend a school in a system 
which nominally meets the Green-Swann standard. The equitable 
powers of federal judges to fashion appropriate desegregation remedies 
also have been limited; interdistrict busing strongly disfavored; and 
maintaining integrated schools in the face of white flight substantially 
impeded by linking continued judicial surveillance to proof of discrim-
inatory intent or purpose. 
The Burger Court did reject the Reagan administration position 
that school desegregation plans be not only halted, but undone. But 
the Court was clearly prepared to witness a substantially diminished 
desegregation imperative. It is, in fact, likely that maximum school 
desegregation in the United States has been achieved, and that we have 
begun (and apparently will tolerate) a steady retreat from the high 
point of the late 1970s, when about forty percent of America's school 
children (slightly more in the south than in the north) attended more 
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Given that the power of judicial review is not mentioned 
in the Constitution, however, Marshall's purpose was obviously to transcend article III and in-
corporate into the Constitution a much broader conception of judicial power. Thus, Marbury 
stands more for a broad than for a limited interpretation of judicial power. 
27. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 107 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
28. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
29. 402 U.S. 912 (1971). 
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than nominally integrated schools. 30 After Milliken v. Bradley (Milli-
ken II), 31 when the Court said that a court-ordered plan that empha-
sized resources for the black schools and remedial teaching efforts 
rather than aggressive desegregation was responsive to "the condition 
which offends the Constitution,"32 and thus met the Swann version of 
Brown, some observers said that the Supreme Court was countenanc-
ing a return to a benign (but perhaps more insidious) version of the 
"separate-but-equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson. 33 I think that, 
tragically, that is what has happened. 
One finds a similar strategy of judicial disengagement in the 1970s 
reapportionment cases (which, inexplicably, are omitted from discus-
sion in the book), and in the Court's "deconstitutionalization" of Mi-
randa and Mapp. As Yale Kamisar (p. 143) has noted, the Burger 
Court's strategy has been to chip away at Miranda, excising those re-
quirements not specifically supported by the original facts of the case, 
and then holding that the Miranda rules were not themselves of con-
stitutional dimension, but merely prophylactic devices designed to en-
force the fifth amendment. New "public safety" and "inevitable 
discovery" exceptions have been adopted,34 but, almost inexplicably, 
the Court has now announced that Miranda, in its new slimmed down 
version, strikes the proper balance. The exclusionary rule announced 
in Mapp v. Ohio is under greater attack, and seems more likely to be 
repudiated. It has also been downgraded to a mere prophylactic rule; 
and the good faith exception, 35 at the moment linked only to the war-
rant requirement, seems a likely precursor to full excision. 
Similar examples of the Burger Court's incremental restructuring 
of liberal constitutional doctrine by reducing judicial policy interven-
tion are found throughout the book. The three-part Lemon 36 test for 
determining an unconstitutional establishment of religion is a likely 
candidate for judicial surgery. The same can be said for the doctrine 
that the first amendment is not limited primarily to the protection of 
political speech, and that with some exceptions such as libel and ob-
scenity, all expression is of equal value. Lyle Denniston's essay (p. 23) 
neatly points out how the New York Times v. Sullivan 37 case might be 
used by its opponents to bring about what would be a major regression 
in first amendment doctrine. Indeed, reinvigoration of the "two-level" 
theory of first amendment protections, all but lost in the modem lib-
30. C. BULLOCK & C. LAMB, IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS POLICY 55-92 (1984). 
31. 433 U.S. 267 (1977). 
32. 433 U.S. at 282. 
33. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
34. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
35. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
36. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
37. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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eral sweep toward a near absolutist interpretation, seems a very likely 
possibility. 
For the sake of accuracy it must be conceded that judicial disen-
gagement was not the exclusive denominator of the Burger Court. 
That Court is almost entirely responsible for the legal revolution in 
gender equality (although critics contend that it did not go far enough 
to eliminate gender inequality). It fostered the movement to extend 
constitutional rights to prison and hospital inmates - before pulling 
back in several recent decisions. It extended the right of privacy to 
abortions, and notwithstanding some concessions made to governmen-
tal restrictions on funding abortions, maintained that doctrine under 
extreme pressure. Until Bowers v. Hardwick 38 it even seemed to be 
developing a doctrine of "sexual due process" to protect the autonomy 
of private decisions in matters of sexual preference. 
III 
Constitutional policymaking is a continuous enterprise. It seems 
appropriate, therefore, to conclude this essay with some observations 
on trends likely to have long-term consequences which have not yet 
been fully articulated in the Burger years. Most obvious on the doctri-
nal side of the ledger is the growing reenchantment with private prop-
erty (and disenchantment with its regulation) and the emergence, or 
resuscitation, of doctrinal thinking designed to restore its legal and 
constitutional primacy. There were certainly some hints of this in the 
Burger years in efforts to revive the contract clause, and in keying 
some first amendment decisions to property rights. Justice Scalia's 
opinion last year in the California beachfront case39 forecasts contin-
ued movement in this direction. Challenges to the delegation of power 
doctrine, which is central to the legal structure of the administrative 
state, are also on the horizon. The administrative state is not likely to 
fall, but its scope and authority to regulate have certainly become 
more vulnerable to restriction, and its primacy is no longer 
unchallengeable. 
Two other trends should be noted. First, there is the increasing 
empirical base of constitutional litigation. The Burger Court did not 
welcome, and certainly did not embrace, this development, but its 
march seems inexorable. What is the probative value of systematic 
statistical evidence, and to what extent should the determination of 
constitutional rights depend on it? Constitutional law - good consti-
tutional law - after all, depends as much on valid observations about 
the nature of society and human behavior as it does on textual inter-
pretation. The Burger Court made some effort to incorporate empiri-
38. 107 S. Ct. 29 (1986). 
39. Nollan v. California Coastal Commn., 107 s. Ct. 3141 (1987); See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
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cal observations into its decision in the jury-size cases, 40 but shied 
away from serious empirical inquiry in other cases, such as the deter-
rent value of capital punishment.41 The Rehnquist Court's decision in 
McCleskey v. Kemp rejected a statistically-based equal protection chal-
lenge to the death penalty, although it did not dismiss it out of hand.42 
Cases generated by the Meese Commission Report on Pornography on 
the alleged harms of sexual violence will once again necessitate consid-
eration of social science data and its implications. Ultimately the 
Court will have to come to terms with a form of knowledge which has 
achieved increasing legitimacy in the social and political worlds. 
Legal empiricism began with the "Brandeis Brief" largely as a liberal 
effort to challenge traditional conservative legal doctrines. But in-
creasingly it has transcended ideology and been embraced by advo-
cates for conservative causes. As a new generation of justices, trained 
in statistics and comfortable with social science, reaches the bench, 
much orthodox legal and constitutional thinking will need to be 
reexamined. 
Second, the empirical basis of constitutional jurisprudence has al-
ready begun to be tested in the Court's largely formalistic, and increas-
ingly surrealistic, view of the political system. Recent decisions about 
party primaries and conventions, and political gerrymandering, have 
brought the Court into closer contact with the electoral system;43 deci-
sions about campaign contributions and their regulation have impli-
cated the larger political system. 44 In each of these cases, as with the 
early reapportionment cases, the Court has been forced to make em-
pirical assumptions about the operation of our political system that 
many have found unsatisfactory. A complete assessment of the Bur-
ger years will need to recognize both phenomena: the expanding con-
stitutional framework of politics, and the growing empiricism of 
constitutional litigation. 
40. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-39 (1978). 
41. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion). 
42. 107 S. Ct. 3199 (1987). 
43. See, e.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 
U.S. 109 (1986). 
44. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
